

## به نام خدا

طرح درس « فلسفه غرب پیشرفته »

آزادی اراده (اختیار)

شماره تلفن: ۶۶۱۶۴۱۴۵

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خانه برگ\*: <http://sina.sharif.edu/~ataheri/index.html>

### اهداف درس

۱. مطالعه تخصصی یک مسئله اساسی در فلسفه غرب
  ۲. کسب مهارت در فهم متون فلسفی
- (حضور غیر رسمی (آزاد) در کلاس مجاز است.)

### متن درس

مقالاتی که در ادامه ذکر می شوند.

### برنامه تقریبی

مهر ۰۳ درآمد

O'Connor (2022)

۱۰ بررسی تاریخی

Thomas Aquinas(2014: Q 82-83)

John Locke (1690 : 2: 21)

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\* در این صفحه می توانید راهنمایی هایی برای خواندن و نگارش در فلسفه بیابید.

فلسفه علم	فلسفه غرب پیشرفته ۴۲۵۴۴	دانشگاه صنعتی شریف
دو شنبه ها: ۱۴-۱۶	سیدعلی طاهری	نیمسال ۱۴۰۲۱
۱۷	بررسی تاریخی	
	ادامه	
۲۴	بررسی تاریخی	
	Hume (1748: 8) ; Kant: 1785: 3)	
۰۱	سازگار گرایی / ناسازگار گرایی	آبان
	Ayer (1954); Strawson (1962)	
۰۸	سازگار گرایی / ناسازگار گرایی	
	Van Inwagen (1975); Lewis (1981)	
۱۵	سازگار گرایی / ناسازگار گرایی	
	Van Inwagen (2004); Clarke (2009)	
۲۲	سازگار گرایی و ناسازگار گرایی	
	Mele (2006: ch. 7); Mckenna (2008)	
۲۹	تحلیل آزادی اراده	
	Frankfurt (1969); Ginet (1996)	
	Fischer (2010)	
۰۶	تحلیل آزادی اراده	آذر
	Campbell (1951); Fischer (1987)	
	Franklin (2015)	
۱۳	تحلیل آزادی اراده	
	Zagzebski (2000); Watson (1987)	
	Fischer and Ravizza (1998: ch. 3)	

## تحلیل مسئولیت اخلاقی

۲۰

Shoemaker (2011); Smith (2012)

Stump (1999)

اختیارگرایی

۲۷

Chisholm (1964); Clarke (1996)

اختیار گرایی

۰۴

دی

Kane (2016); Palmer (2021)

O'Connor (2021)

شکاکیت در باره آزادی اراده

۱۱

Vilhauer (2012)

## ارزیابی دانشجویان

چگونگی ارزیابی با انتخاب دانشجو با یکی از دو گزینه ذیل خواهد بود:

۱. آزمون پایانی. موعده آزمون: ۲ بهمن ماه، ساعت ۱۴.

۲. نگارش مقاله ۴۵۰۰ کلمه ای مطابق با شیوه نامه ای که در اختیار قرار خواهد گرفت.

## مراجع درس

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